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On June 24, 1991, a third-party investigation team consisting of Richard P. 
Thomas, Duey E. Milner, James L. Moore, and Dick Whiting began an investigation into 
the blowout of well KS-8, which occurred at the Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) site on 
June 12, 1991, and caused the unabated release of steam for a period of 31 hours before 
PGV succeeded in closing in the well. 
The scope of the investigation was to: (a) determine the cause(s) of the incident; 
(b) evaluate the adequacy of PGVs drilling and blowout prevention equipment and 
procedures; and (c) make recommendations for any appropriate changes in equipment 
and/or procedures. 
This repon finds that the blowout occurred because of inadequacies in PGVs 
drilling plan and procedures and not as a result of unusual or unmanageable subsurface 
geologic or hydrologic conditions. While the geothermal resource in the area being drilled 
is relatively hot, the temperatures are not excessive for modem technology and methods to 
control. Fluid pressures encountered are also manageable if proper procedures are 
followed and the appropriate equipment is utilized. 
A previous blowout of short duration occurred on February 21, 1991, at the KS-7 
injection well being drilled by PGV at a depthpfsrpproximately 1600'. This unexpected 
incident alerted PGV to the possibility of encountering a high temperature, fractured zone 
at a relatively shallow depth. The experience at KS-7 prompted PGV to refine its 
hydrological model; however, the drilling plan utilized for KS-8 was not changed. 
Not only did PGV fail to modify its drilling program following the KS-7 blowout, 
but they also failed to heed numerous "red flags" (warning signals) in the five days 
preceding the KS-8 blowout, which included a continuous I-inch flow of drilling mud out 
of the wellbore, gains in mud volume while pulling stands, and gas entries while 
circulating muds bottoms up, in addition to lost circulation that had occurred earlier below 
the shoe of the 13-3/8-hch casing. 
While there was nothing unusual about encountering a large fracture at a depth of 
3476', especially in light of the drilling experience at KS-7, it was clearly unusual and 
inappropriate under the circumstances for PGV to be drilling KS-8 at that depth with a 
mud weight in excess of 10.6 lbs/gal. When the bit encountered the fracture, the heavy 
drilling mud probably entered the fracture, leaving the well bore partially void of confining 
fluid, thus allowing steam, gases, etc. from the fractures to enter the well bore, producing 
the "kick" that led to the blowout. 
The decision made by PGV personnel on June 12th to continue to drill to 4000' 
before setting 9-5/8" casing should not have been made. The casing string should have 
been set at 3177' and cemented to surface in order to seal off the fluids attempting to 
flow into the well and to sene as a good anchor for additional blowout prevention 
equipment prior to drilling ahead. 
While not the cause of the blowout, PGVs drilling supervision prior to the kick was 
inadequate in light of the indications that KS-8 could become a problem well. 
PGV personnel took appropriate steps to control the well following the kick. 
However, there were certain inadequacies in PGVs drilling operations and blowout 
prevention equipment. The mud cooler being used was inefficient. Monitoring equipment 
was not strategically placed. A sufficient supply of cold water was not available to pump 
into the wellbore to properly kill the well in the event of a blowout. The choke line was 
not of sufficient diameter to handle the volume of fluid that had to be vented, and there 
was no silencer on the end of the choke manifold line to reduce noise. 
The investigation team recommends: (1) substantial changes in PGVs drilling 
procedures and supervision; (2) several equipment modifications; and (3) significant 
improvements in regulatory oversight. The investigation team concludes that if the 
recommendations presented in this report .are implemented, drilling geothermal wells in 
the Kilauea East Rift Zone may proceed safely. This conclusion is limited to the scope of 
this investigation which pertains only to the technical aspects of geothermal drilling 
procedures and equipment. 
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INTRODUCI'ION 
On February 21, 1991, a blowout of short duration occurred on the KS-7 injection 
well being drilled by Puna Geothermal Venture. On June 12, 1991, another more serious 
blowout occurred on KS-8. 
Subsequent to the events, the State of Hawaii and the County of Hawaii requested 
a special investigation team named below to: (a) determine to the best of the team's 
ability the cause(s) of the incident; (b) evaluate the adequacy of PGV's drilling and 
blowout prevention equipment and procedures; and (c) make recommendations for 
appropriate changes in equipment and/or procedures. 
Note: To help the non-technical reader, this report includes a simplified hole 
circulating system diagram showing monitoring device locations (Fig. l), a simplified 
BOPE configuration diagram (Fig. 2), and a glossary. 
APPROACH 
The investigation team anived on the Big Island on the afternoon of June 24, 
1991. The team decided to: (1) request and review documents from Puna Geothermal 
Venture, including but not limited to summary reports, mud logs, tour reports, directional 
drilling information, and mud reports; (2) interview key personnel and other people with 
information considered "key"; and (3) visit the site both on the ground and in the air. 
Because of the short time frame for carrying out the investigation and preparing the 
report, it was decided not to expand on the team's specific obligations. 
I .  
In general, Richard Thomas and James Moore took the lead in investigating 
geologic, hydrologic and permitting aspects, while Duey Milner and Dick Whiting took the 
lead in investigating drillingprocedures, and equipment aspects. All of the team members 
agree on the contents of the report, which indudes infomation from the many sources. 
INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS: 
Richard P. Thomas, Team Leader, Geothermal Officer, State of California Department of 
Conservation, Division of Oil and Gas 
Duey E. Milner, Geothermal D d h g  Supemisor, Independent Contractor 
James L. Moore, Senior Vice President, Natural Resources, California Energy Company 
Dick whiting, Resource Engineer, State of Nevada, Department of Minerals 
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PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY INVESnGATION TEAM 
Maurice A. Richard, Regional Development Manager, Puna 
Geothermal Venture 
Norman J. Clark, Project Manager, Puna Geothermal 
Venture 
William J. Teplow, Field Manager, Puna Geothermal 
Venture 
Teny L. Crowson, Drilling Superintendent, Puna 
Geothermal Venture 
Roger Hankon, Reservoir Engineer, Consultant for Puna Geothermal Venture 
Tom Jones, Operations Manager, Parker-Drilling Company 
Mark Andrews, Tool Pusher, Parker DriUing Company 
Bill Earles, Driller, Parker Drilling Company 
John Bishop, Demckman, Parker Drilling Company 
Dale Henewing, Motorman, Parker Drilling Company 
Clement Kalung, Floorman, Parker Drilling Company 
J.D. White, Mud Engineer, Baroid 
B.J. Livesay, Consultant, Livesay Incorporated 
Mike McLaughlin, Mudlogger, Tecton Incorporated (ExLog-Smith) 
Eric Tanaka, Geothermal Technician, Department of Land and Natural Resources 
Chauncey Hew, Geologist, Department of Health 
Jim Kauahikaua, Geophysicist, U.S.G.S. 
Richard Moore, Geologist, U.S.G.S. 
Frank Truesdell, Geologist, U.S.G.S. 
4 
GEOLOGY 
High temperature geothermal resources are known to be contained within the East 
Rift system of Kilauea volcano in the Puna area of the Island of Hawaii. Although high 
temperature geothermal resources may be present within other rift zones on the Big Island 
and the specific geology of such other rifts zones strongly suggest this, the presence of 
such resources has not been confirmed by drilling. 
The East Rift system of Kilauea is defined as a relatively straight feature extending 
in a NE by SW direction along the lower seaward flanks of the volcano and extending at 
least 20 kilometers out to sea. 
At the surface, the rift is characterized by a linear expression whose width may 
vary from one-half to one and one-half miles. Abundant evidence in the form of recent 
vent deposits, flow rocks, and altered rock within and along the rift, indicates that the rift 
is plumbed into the Kilauea volcanic system. Eruptive events along its mace tend to cycle 
every 10 to 15 years and can range from simple, quiet flow events to somewhat explosive 
vent displays. 
Hydrologically, the rift most probably intercepts a large portion of the sub-surface, 
down-slope water flow. Some water is effectively dammed in its southeasterly flow to the 
ocean and carried in a northeasterly direction, st i l l  down along the hydraulic gradient but 
parallel to the rift zone. Some of this groundwater undoubtedly finds itself within the 
plumbing of the rift zone, where it becomes part of the geothermal system. 
Within the rift zone, the rocks are generally characterized as volcanic products with 
divergent modes of on&. ‘ I t  appears that the greatest majority of the rocks are simply 
extrusive rocks. These rocks have subsequently been intruded by a number of near- 
vertical, sub-pardel dikes which tend to control the internal movement of fluids, especially 
in a direction at right angles to the edge of the rift. Given the lateral partitioning, aquifer 
and reservoir discontinuities are expected within and between the margins of the rift. 
DRILLING PERMITS AND INSPECIlONS 
Geothermal Well Drilling Permits for production wells in Haw& are issued by the 
Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR). The Department of Health (DOH) 
issues an Authority to Construct P d t  for both production and injection web, in 
addition to a letter of approval to construct dedicated injection wells. In all cases, the 
operator submits a proposed drilling program to the respective agencies, which includes 
information the agencies need to show that regulations are and will be met. Included in 
the DLNR regulations are a description of casing strings and setting depths, and required 
Blowout Prevention Equipment (BOPE) for various drilling scenarios. 
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In w e b  KS-7 and KS-8, which were originally proposed as injection wells, the DOH 
issued the permits to drill, had authority to allow casing changes, but did not have a 
trained inspector in the field to make drilling observations. 
On the other hand, an inspector for DLNR typically visited the PGV site daily and 
recorded drilling observations, but had no authority to approve changes in operations. 
At the t h e  of the KS-8 incident, DLNR was reviewing a proposal submitted by PGV 
to complete the well as a production well. 
GENEWU. DRILLING PROGRAM AT PGV IDCATION 
In the general drilling program, a 26-inch hole is drilled without BOPE from about 
60' to approximately '1200' and cased. A 17-1/2-hch hole is drilled to (2000' - 2 2 O O ' ) ,  
passing through an unconfined aquifer, containing fresh water naturally contaminated by 
an underlying geothermal system. Blowout protection is provided by an annular preventer 
and a diverter (Fig. 3). The well is then cased at about 2000'. 
According to the "Production and Iniection Well Cashis! Monitorinn P r o m "  
submitted by PGV to DOH on April 28, 1991, a zone between 2000' and 2600' serves as 
an effective aquitard separating the high temperature zone from the low temperature zone. 
Locally, the aquitard may be breached as in the area of injection well KS-7 (Note: This 
well experienced a blowout incident and is described below.) and monitor well GTW 111 
where anomalously high shallow groundwater temperatures and salinities are observed. 
WELL KS-7 BLOWOUT INCIDENT 
On February 21, well KS-7 was drilled through an intensely mineralized zone, had 
minor mud flow returns during connections below 1500', and blew out at 1678', injuring 
a righand. The driller quickly closed the annular preventer, and vented fluid out a 3-inch 
diverter, before closing the diverter and securing the well. At the time of the incident , 
the annular preventer, which was secured to 13-3/8-hch casing cemented at 1020', 
served as the sole BOPE. The well was subsequently plugged and suspended. According 
the Puna's proposal, flow into the hole was not anticipated to occw at this relatively 
shallow depth. 
DRILLING ACINITIES ON WELL KS-8 PRIOR TO, DURING, AND Az.TER THE BLOWOUT 
Well KS-8 Drillinn History 
Subsequent to suspending KS-7 and working over KS-IA, PGV moved onto the 
KS-8 wellpad and commenced to directionally drill injection well KS-8 in the direction of 
KS-7 (See Fig. 4). The drilling history for KS-8 for the dates May 1, 1991 through June 
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6, 1991 is located in Appendix B. The following history starts on June 7, 1991 and has 
been assembled mainly from information shown on tour reports, the drilling history, and 
other repons supplied by PGV, as well as from infomation gathered in a series of 
interviews held with involved personnel (Note: All temperatures are in degrees 
Fahrenheit) : 
It should be noted that on June 7, 1991, the casing condition of the hole was as 
follows: 30-inch casing cemented from 70' to surface; 20-inch casing cemented from 
1032' to surface; 13-3/8-h& casing cemented from 2128' to surface; 12-1/4-inch open 
hole to 3177'. Blowout prevention was provided by the BOPE stack shown on Figure 5 .  
Prior to this date, mud temperature in was less than 130', mud temperature out less than 
135", CO, - 300 pprn, and H2S - 0 ppm. 
06-07-91 : Drilled and surveyed from 3177' to 3401', pulled out of hole, picked 
up mud motor, ran in hole, attempted to drill, pulled out of hole 15 
stands. At 9:15 am the flow line temperature was 172". 
06-08-91: Well started to flow, ran back to bottom, gained 16 barrels (bbls) of 
mud, circulated and built mud weight to 10.4 lbs/gal. (ppg), spotted 
heavy mud weight on bottom (112 ppg). Pulled out of hole with 
mud motor, well flowing 1-inch stream. Ran in hole open-ended, 
circulated at 1054', ran to 2079', circulated. 
06-09-91 : Ran to 2725', circulated, ran to 3401', circulated. During circulation, 
mud temperature in was less than 132", mud temperature out was less 
than 146". Bottoms up at 3400', mud temperature out 205", CO, - 
330-5600 ppm, H2S - 80 ppm. Rigged up Halliburton (cementing 
company), cemented with 50 sacks of Hawaii cement, pulled 3 stands, 
well was flowing. Waited on cement. Ran in hole, tagged cement at 
3298'. Rigged up Halliiburton, pumped 28 sacks cement. Pulled out 
of hole with drill pipe, picked up driUing assembly ran in hole on top 
of cement at 3151'. During circulation mud temperature in was less , 
than 148', mud temperature out was less than 147". Bottoms up at 
3151', mud temperature out 209", CO, - 330-10,300 ppm, H,S - 190 
PPm. 
06-10-91: Drilled cement from 3151' to 3350', well flowing (1-inch stream). 
Pulled out of hole with drilling assembly, ran in hole open-ended to 
3350'. During circulation mud temperature in was less than 137", 
mud temperature out was less than 162". Bottoms up at 3350', mud 
temperature out 189", CO, - 330-780 ppm, H,S - 0-10 ppm. Rigged 
up Halliiburton, pumped 50 sacks of cement spotted on bottom, pulled 
up to 2135', circulated at 3140', pumped 35 sacks of cement, 
spotting on bottom. Pulled 5 stands. Closed pipe ram, squeezed away 
3 bbls at 300 psi. Opened rams, pulled out of hole. 
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06-11-91: Picked up drilling assembly and ran in hole to 2060', waited on 
cement, and circulated, ran in hole to top of cement at 2845', drilled 
cement to 3350', circulated hole, pulled 8 stands, gained 20 bbls. mud 
in pits, ran in hole to bottom at 3350', circulated and cooled hole. 
During circulation, mud temperature in was less than 148', 
temperature out was less than 169". Bottoms up at 3350', mud 
temperature out 164'. 
Note: According to the "Geothermal Well Ks-8 Uncontrolled Flow Event and Well Desim 
Review", made available to the investigation team by PGV, a meeting took place at the 
PGV office in the afternoon of June 12. Attendees were project and drilling personnel. 
Interviews conducted by the investigation team substantiated that the meeting resulted in 
the following decisions: 
"It was decided that PGV would elect to drill deeper in order to set the 9-5/8-hch 
casing in the well at a depth nearer to 4000' as originally detailed in the well 
prognosis. It was decided to drill out the cement h t h e  bottom of the well after 
circulating bottoms up at 3350'. It was decided to maintain a mud weight of 10.5 
ppg in circulating bottoms up and to drill ahead with this mud weight. It was also 
decided to make Maximum Recording Temperature (MRT) runs inside the drill pipe 
at every stand after drilling recommenced. It was planned to plot the MRT data on 
the temperature graphs and by means of this data to ascertain when to run the 
9-5/8-hch Casing." 
6-12-91: Checked for flow, 1-inch stream to pits, pulled out of hole, rigged up 
loggers to xun temperature logs. (Note: The 1-inch stream could be caused 
by heat expansion.) Ran temperature logs and all failed with no results, 
rigged down loggers, picked up drilling assembly, ran in hole to 3350'. 
Circulated bottoms up at 3350', mud temperature out 165', CO, - 9350 
ppm, H,S - 83 ppm. Drilled cement from 3350' to 3401 ' . Drilled new 
formation from 3401' to 3 4 8 8 ' ~  Mud temperature at 3450', 129' in, 
151" out. Mud temperature at 3460', 128' in 150' out. Driller drilled 
into large fracture, starting a sequence of events which led to the blowout. 
Well unloaded. Mud temperature recorded at 3488 ' , 11 1 O in, 260' + out. 
indications to the driller were that pump pressure was increasing. The 
mudlogger was on the way up to the rig floor when he noticed that fluid 
was coming over the shale shaker. The driller was picking up the kelly to 
close the BOPE's when the well unloaded at about 11:16 pm. 
The following describes the conditions found and the sequence of events and 
actions taken during the kick and uncontrolled flow: 
06-12-91: 1. The rotating head that was nippled up on the top of the BOPE stack 
was destroyed at the time of the first kick. 
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2. 
3: 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
06/13/91,: 8. 
9. 
The annular preventer (Hydril) was damaged and the packing . 
element ruptured by the excessive pressure impulse of the gas. The 
Hydril was made inoperative. 
The driller was forced away from the brake due to the excessive 
steam that engulfed the area at the time of the kick and the floor 
plate buckled around the driller's console. As a result, the kelly 
dropped into the area of the pipe ram closure. The driller then 
closed the upper rams around the kelly. Pipe rams will not close 
completely around the hexagonal kelly, therefore, there was leakage 
around the kelly which prevented the crew from being able to work 
on the floor. The rig floor was engulfed in steam. 
The location was cleared and all personnel were accounted 'for. 
Agencies and PGV personnel were notified. 
The following decisions were made to: 
a. Shut down electric power to the rig drawworks at the Silicon 
Controlled Rectifier (SCR) panel. 
b. Move the safety trailer from the site to a location above the 
site and away from the wellhead. 
c. Wait until daylight to reassess the situation and to take other 
actions around the rig and on the rig floor. . .  
Personnel with safety gear moved the safety trailer fiom the site to a 
location above the site and away from the wellhead. 
At da& (6:Oo am) the Hydraulically Controlled Relief (HCR) valve 
was opened, venting the well through the choke manifold and the ' 
leakage around the kelly in the pipe rams. 
it was at this point that it became known that: 
a. The Hydril was inoperative. 
b. The damage to the kill line and to the mud line had caused 
the pumps to pump onto the drill site and not down the drill 
pipe. The mud pits were dry. 
c. The bottom metal pipe rams and the upper blind rams were 
sti l l  open. 
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10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
06/14/91: 14. 
15. 
16. 
I ' .  
It was decided to mobilize Halliburton to pump cold water down the 
drill pipe. 
Parker crews rigged the Halliburton cementing lines to the standpipe 
and closed the lower valve to the fill-up line. This established the 
path to pump fluids down the drill pipe. 
Halliiburton was rigged to pump down the drill pipe through 
cementing lines. (10:30 am) 
Closed in the choke line. Pumped water at 9.5 bbls/min. Pressure 
at 1700 psi decreasing to 900 psi. Bottom pipe rams closed. 
Rigged up lines to Halliiburton to pump down the annulus. Pumped 
5 bbls/min. down the annulus. Initial pressure at 1700 psi reducing 
to 1000 psi. Pumped down the drill pipe at 4 bbls/min., pressure 
sti l l  at 900 psi (4:OO am). 
Pumped lost circulation material (LCM) to plug off steel pipe rams. 
Flow was controlled. (1O:OO am) 
Changed out the top pipe rams. Steel rams with LCM held. 
Figure 6 shows the casing diagram of KS-8 effective June 23, 1991 and diagramed 
by PGV. 
Figure 7 shows the static temperature and pressure profiles recorded on surveys 
run June 21, 1991. At the time of the survey, water was being injected in the casing/drill 
pipe annulus at 3 bbls/min. The graph of KS-8 suggests that geothermal fluids at about 
633" and 1950 psi are entering the wellbore near 3488'i and flowing up the wellbore 
and into fractures below the-shoe of the 13-3/8-h& casing at 2128'. 
CURRENT STATUS OF WELL KS-8 
At the time of preparation of this report, steam flow from the well has stopped and 
the control of wellhead pressure is being maintained by the use of low volume water 
injection into the wellbore. However, complete "killing" of the well, defined as the 
elimination of all heat and pressure at the wellhead, either by means of heavy mud, 
cement, or high volume pumpage of water, has not been achieved. The well is being 
cooled by the injection of water, and the down-hole temperatures and pressures are 
decreasing. Surface pressure measured at the wellhead is 5 psi. Planning and preparation 
work is currently underway to determine the appropriate procedure for killing the well. 
Once the well is killed, PGV plans to set cement plugs at the appropriate depths to seal 
off fluid entries near the bottom of the hole and the lost circulation zone just below the 
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shoe of the 13-3/8-inch casing. PGV has indicated that after the well is killed and total 
control is established, the well will be secured for M e r  evaluation. 
ANALYSIS OF SHALUlW SUBSURFACE GEOLOGIC SYSIEM (Surface to 2000') 
In a subsurface geologic system such as may occur in the rift zone, the presence of 
vertical cracks intercepting largely horizontal basalt layers may allow locally for the 
existence of high temperature fluids and high pressure at relatively shallow levels. 
It appears that the shallow blowout experience on KS-7 led to a refinement of the 
PGV's hydrological model. The possibility of a breached aquitard is discussed in the April 
1991 document submitted by PGV to DOH. 
In spite of new information suggesting the existence of a shallow system, the 
drilling program was not changed for KS-8, due to the belief that conditions were different 
and more typical of conditions encountered in previously drilled wells. KS-8 was 
successfully drilled to 2000' without incident. 
ANALYSIS OF THE DEEP KICK IN KS-8 
One explanation of the conditions which KS-8 encountered is as follows: 
The temperature and pressure measurements in KS-8 (See Fig. 71, taken after-the- 
fact, indicate greater temperatures and pressures with depth than the maximum 
temperatures and pressures which were expected based on water/steam pressure and 
temperature phase change projections. The anomalous temperatures and pressures can be 
explained on the basis that the drill bit encountered a hydrologically balanced, sub- 
vertical fracture which when'opened by the bit, enabled the deeper (stable at the deeper, 
higher pressure reservoir) liquids to move to a higher level. Once the pressure on the 
deeper water was reduced, the liquids flashed into steam and hence violently vented , 
through the hole toward the surface. 
An alternative explanation could be that as part of the Kilauea inflation and 
deflation cycle, magma could have recently been emplaced at a relatively higher level 
beneath the reservoir providing the mechanism for increasing the pressure and 
temperature of the reservoir. 
There were numerous "red flags" (warning signals) in the 5 days preceding the 
blowout, such as a continuous 1-inch flow of drilling mud out of the wellbore, gains in 
mud volume while pulling stands, and gas entries while circulating bottoms up, in addition 
to lost circulation that had occurred earlier below the shoe of the 13-3/8-hch casing. 
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The decision to drill to a depth of 4000' should not have been made. With all of 
the "red flags" that were noticed during the drilling of KS-8 from the shoe of the 13-3/8- 
inch casing cemented at a depth of 2128' to 3177', it is our opinion that the 9-5/8-hch 
casing string should have been set at 3177' and cemented to surface in order to control 
and isolate the problem behind casing and allow a good anchor for BOPE prior to further 
drilling. 
Any flow from the well bore of a geothermal well being drilled that cannot be 
controlled or stopped indicates that there is a serious problem down hole. The first line 
of defense against a blowout, the hydrostatic head of the drilling fluid column, is 
diminished with any type of uncontrolled flow. Whether the flow is being caused by 
temperature or pressure from down hole makes little or no difference. Either cause 
creates a problem. 
There was nothing unusual about encountering a large fracture at 3476'. The 
unusual situation was that the mud column in the hole was in excess of 10.6 ppg. When 
the bit encountered the fracture, the heavy driUing mud probably entered the fracture, 
leaving the well bore partially void of confining fluid, thus allowing steam, gases, etc. from 
the fractures to enter the well bore. 
Kicks in geothermal wells are usually controlled with the use of cold or cool water. 
Rarely or never in the panel's experience has weighted mud been used to control a 
geothermal kick. This is why it is recommended to have a large supply of cold or cool 
water on location and a pump system capable of delivering it to the intended zone. 
ANALYSIS OF BIDWOUT EQUIPMENT 
The following observations were made of the existing BOPE. 
1. It was reported to us that the mud cooler that is being used on this well 
only cools the mud some 10". Also, it was necessary to shut it down for 
cleaning with each drill pipe connection. It is not an efficient mud cooler. 
2. It was reported by the driller that the mud pump #2 was being operated at 
90 to 100 strokes per minute (spm) with 6-inch lines. The mud pumps 
should have been pumping a minimum of 150 spm with this liner size (6") 
for that diameter hole (12-1/4"). 
3 The pit level indicators and other monitoring equipment on the rig were not 
in strategic places for the driller to observe. The pit alarm system was 
hooked up only in the Exlog mud loggefs trailer. This made it necessary 
for the driller to wait to hear from the mud logger to find out that there 
was a problem developing. If the mud logger was not in his trailer at the 
time of an alarm, more time would be lost. Time is a very important factor 
in controlling kicks. 
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4. It has been noted that the fresh water supply at this location is at least 
100”. Geothennal wells that kick can and have been easily controlled by 
pumping large volumes of cool or cold water into the well bore. A source 
with a temperature less than 75”, such as ocean water, could be used. 
5. From all of the reports, both written and oral, it was evident the choke line 
was not of sufficient diameter to handle the volume of fluid that had to be 
vented from the well at the time of the kick. Also the +inch valve on the 
choke line had to be manually opened. The time involved in opening the 4- 
inch valve is critical when taking a kick of this magnitude. 
6 .  At the time of this kick there was no silencer or muffler on the end of the 
choke manifold line, which caused a great deal more noise than necessary. 
It has been reported that approximately ten minutes before the blowout occurred, 
both the drilling supervisor and the toolpusher left the floor to go to their trailers, leaving 
the driller alone on the floor drilling a well that had for almost a week been showing 
signs of becoming a problem well. This was also just prior to a crew change. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Effective, safe and efficient geothermal exploration requires that both regulators and 
operators conceptually understand the complexities of a geothermal system. They must 
understand that the subsurface conditions varies from well-to-well and in fact may, with 
time, change within an individual well. The decision process of the operator and his 
communications with the appropriate regulatory body(ies) must be based on this kind of 
understanding. Specific parameters for well design and possible modification during 
drilling must be made on a well-by-well basis, often as demanded by the subsurface , 
conditions encountered during the drilling process. The mechanism to accomplish such a 
process must be timely and safe. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UPPER PORTION OF WELL (Sltrface to 2000’) 
Additional precautions should be taken to assure that blowout prevention 
equipment is maximized in case high temperature geothermal fluids are encountered at 
depths well above the currently modeled depths. We recommend that: 
1. The operators be conservative and flexiile in their approach to casing the 
well above 2000 ’ . 
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2. If the operator must drill below 500' without BOPE, he should: 
a. Run maximum bottom hole temperatures every connection, looking 
for an increase in thermal gradient, 
b. Take representative water samples and have them analyzed as soon 
as possible to monitor increases in salinity and conductivity, and 
c. Catch cutting samples every 10' and analyze them for the presence 
of hydrothermal minerals. 
If it appears that a geothermal zone may be encountered soon, the operator 
with approval of the DLNR, should be prepared to run casing, cement, and 
rig up with appropriate blowout protection. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EQUIPMENT MODIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT 
There are six areas of equipment modification which;if they had been made prior 
to the KS-8 event, may have prevented the blowout. Given the high temperatures of this 
resource, we recommend that the following modifications be made: 
1. There is a need for a larger flow relief from the BOPE stack. This would 
prevent damage to the well control equipment, allowing the flow to be 
diverted safely and rapidly away from the rig floor. The relief line should 
have a low pressure burst plate to automatically divert the flow so that the 
crew is able to secure the well. In addition to a larger diverter line which 
should be 13-3/8-inch in diameter, an additional double gate preventer 
should be included in the stack (See Fig. 8). 
2. At the discharge end of this 13-3/8-inch divener line a silencer or m d e r  
should be installed. This piece of equipment would greatly reduce the noise 
factor if it becomes necessary to divm any flow from the well. 
3. The mud pumps should be equipped with the maximum sized pump liners, 
and should be used when attempting to control a kick, at maximum stroke. 
4. Facilities for a cool water supply, sufficient to kill a kick in a largediameter 
hole such as KS-8, must be on location at alE times while drilling. 
5. The present mud cooling system is inadequate to properly cool the drilling 
fluid for wells such as KS-8. Either a larger mud cooler or the addition of 
another mud cooler to the system should be required. 
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6. A monitoring device should be installed for the driller. This would give the 
driller quicker information regarding any downhole pressures and changes. 
A pit alarm system should be included with this monitoring device. This 
would give the driller a chance to react to any changes and allow the crew 
to operate the blowout prevention equipment that is available to secure the 
well. 
Figures 9 and 10 show two BOPE stack arrangements which may be appropriate 
for future drilling activities at the PGV site. I t  is recommended that they be considered by 
the operator and DLNR prior to resumption of operations. It should be noted that PGV 
has already provided the investigation team with a plan for upgrading equipment and 
procedures, which includes some of the same recommendations. 
RECOMMENDATONS FOR STATE REGULATORY AGENCIES 
There are five recommendations that we suggest for improving regulatory oversight 
on geothermal projects: 
1. The situation that currently exists where there appears to be insufficient 
involvement of DLNR on injection wells should be resolved. DLNR and 
DOH must come to an agreement to jointly provide oversight and regulatory 
conQol to the drilling of all wells, regardless of whether they are intended 
as injection wells or production wells. One possibility is for the agencies to 
enter into a Memorandum of Agreement providing for DOH lead status in 
Underground hjection Control (UIC) review and DLNR lead status in 
drilling program review and inspection for all wells. 
2. Drilling into a bcnued  reservoir requires flexiiility on the part of the 
operators and regulators, coupled with extreme vigilance on the part of the 
operators, because fluids and pressure may be found at depths not predicted 
beforehand. There should be a mechanism in the regulator/operator 
relationship whereby the operator is pemitted to make judgement calls to 
modify his casing program or drilling operations as required, and the 
regulatory agency should be prepared to accept, amend, or deny the 
proposal in a timely manner. 
3. DLNR should be more involved in the casing approval process regardless of 
whether the well is an injection or production well. The casing program 
should be reviewed on a well-to-well basis, incorporating accumulated 
knowledge of the system. DLNR should also make sure that they are 
advised of any changes in the model of the reservoir, and should 
concurrently be developing their own model. 
15 
4. DLNR should mhimke specific BOPE and casing requirements in the 
administrative regulations. Specific descriptions of BOPE and procedures 
could be placed in a manual and updated regularly. DLNR should allow 
flelal>dity in its requirements for BOPE and casings. These requirements 
should allow for modifications during drilling on a case by case basis, 
subject to local variations in geology and reservoir conditions. 
5.  The State of Hawaii should contact the National Geothermal Drilling 
Organization (NGO) and the American Society of Testing of Materials 
(ASTM), ask for a review of current operations, and work toward 
establishing equipment and procedures standards for drilling geothermal 
wells in the state. 
RECOhMENDATIONS FOR SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL 
It is necessary for supervisory personnel to be present on the rig floor while all 
drilling is taking place and especially during crew tour changes to be sure the crew 
coming on tour is instructed and advised of any special instiuctions. We understand that 
blowout prevention drills were performed on this drilling operation prior to the June 12th 
incident. All blowout prevention drills and operations of BOPE should be noted on the 
k1.D.C. tour reports. Also, all toolpushers, drillers, and demckmen should be schooled in 
the use of the recommended monitoring equipment. 
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE PERMTlREGULATORY PROCESS 
1. The regulatory people appear to be qualified and committed, as well as sensitive to 
the local concerns. 
2. The project technical people appear to be technically qualified, committed to the 
project and'sensitive to the concerns of their employees. 
CONCLUSION 
The blowout of KS-8 might have been avoided if PGV had paid heed to warnings 
which the well was signalling for several days prior to the kick. Once having occurred, 
the uncontrolled steam release could have been minimized had the necessary equipment 
and an adequate supply of cold water been available. The investigation team concludes 
that if the recommendations presented in this report are implemented, drilling of 
geothermal wells in the Kilauea East Rift Zone may proceed safely. This conclusion is 
limited to the scope of this investigation which pertains only to the technical aspects of 
geothermal drilling procedures and equipment. 
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GLOSSARY OF DRILLING TERMS 
ACCUMULATOR - A pressure vessel, precharged with a compressed gas above a movable 
barrier, used to store hydraulic fluid under pressure. 
ACCUMULATOR UNIT - (Actuating Unit, Closing Unit) - A compact assembly of pumps, 
valves, accumulators, and other items used to maintain and restore the volume of working 
fluid needed to operate the preventers. 
ACTUATING SYSTEM - (Operating and Control System) - The entire a m y  of equipment 
that provides and controls the hydraulic fluid needed to operate the preventers. Consists 
of the accumulator unit and emergency backup system, the control manifold and remote 
station, and the hydraulic lines to the preventers. 
ANCHOR STRING - The s h g  of casing to which the BOPE stack is flanged. 
ANNULAR PREVENTER - (Bag Preventer) - A device that can seal around almost any 
object in the well bore or upon itself. Compression of a reinforced elastomer packing 
element by hydraulic pressure effects the seal. 
A N W L A R  SPACE OR ANNULUS - The space surrounding a cylindrical object within a 
cylinder. The space around a pipe in a wellbore, the outer wall of which may be the wall 
of either the borehole or the casing; sometimes termed the annulus. 
AOUITARD - A confining bed that retards but does not prevent the flow of water to or 
from an adjacent aquifer. 
BOP - See Blowout Preventer. 
BOP€ - See Blowout Prevention Equipment. 
BANJO BOX - A thick-walled drilling spool used when drilling with air. The spool routes 
retuning air and drill cuttings to a blooie line. 
BELL NIPPLE - (Flow Nipple, Mud Riser) - A piece of pipe with an inside diameter 
equal to or greater than the blowout preventer bore. It is connected to the top of 
blowout preventer or marine riser. A side outlet directs the mud returns to the shale 
shaker or pit. It usually has a second side outlet for fill-up line connection. 
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BLIND RAMS - (Blank, CSO, Complete'Shut Off, Master) - Rams that are not intended 
to seal against any drilling pipe or casing. They seal against each other to effectively close 
the hole. See Ram-Type Preventer. 
BLIND-SHEAR RAMS - Blind rams with a built-in cutting edge that will shear pipe in 
the hole, allowing the blind rams to seal the hole. Used primarily in subsea systems. 
BLOOIE LINE - A large-diameter pipe that routes returning air and drill cuttings to a 
muffler. The line is equipped with high pressure nozzles that both spray water to settle 
dust and spray sodium hydroxide and hydrogen peroxide to eliminate hydrogen sulfide 
odors. 
BLOWOUT - An uncontrolled flow of well fluids and/or formation fluids from the well 
bore to the surface, or into lower-pressured subsurface zones (underground blowout). 
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BLOWOUT PREEATER (BOP) - A device attached to a casinghead that allows the well 
to be sealed to contine the well fluids in the well bore. 
BLOWOUT P R E E m E R  DRILL - A training procedure to determine that rig crews are 
completely familiar with the correct operating practices to be followed in the use of 
blowout prevention equipment. A "dry run" of blowout prevention action. 
BLOWOUT PREVENTER STACK - The assembly of well-control equipment including 
preventers, spools, valves, and nipples connected to the top of the casinghead. 
BLOWOUT PREVENTION EOUIPMENT - The entire m a y  of equipment installed at the 
well to control kicks and prevent blowouts. Consists of the preventers, actuating system, 
and auxiliary equipment. 
CSO RAMS - See Blind Rams. 
CASINGHERDISPOOL - The part of the wellhead to which the blowout preventer stack 
is connected. 
CASING STRING - The entire length of all the joints of casing run in a well. Casing is 
manufactured in lengths of about 30 feet, each length or joint being joined to another as 
casing is run in a well. 
CHOKE - A device with a fixed or variable aperture used to control the flow rate of 
liquids and/or gas. 
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CHOKE LINE - That segment of auxiliary equipment designed to control and direct the 
flow of fluids from the well bore. Consists of the control valve, the choke manifold, and 
all piping from the control valve to the manifold and from the manifold to the fluid 
storage system. 
CHOKE LINE V A L E  - See Control Valve. 
CHOKE MANIFOLD - An assembly of valves, chokes, gauges, and lines used to control 
the rate of flow from the well when the blowout preventers are closed. 
CONDUCTOR PIPE - A short string of pipe set to cover unconsolidated surface 
formations, and to control fluid returns. Usually cemented. 
CONTROL VALVE - The valves connected to the BOPE stack which regulate fluid access 
from the kill line to the well bore and from the well bore to the choke line. 
DERRI%KMAN - The crew member who handles the upper end of the driU stem as it is 
being hoisted out of or lowered into the hole. He is also responsible for the conditioning 
of the drilling fluid and the circulating machinery. 
DIWRTER - A device attached to the wellhead or marine riser to close the vertical access 
and direct any flow into a line away from the rig. It differs from blowout preventers in 
that flow is not stopped, just redirected away from the rig. 
D M W O I X S  - The hoisting mechanism on a drilling rig. It is essentially a large winch 
that spools off or takes in the drilling line and thus raises or lowers the drill stem and bit. 
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DRILLER - The employee directly in charge of a drilling rig and crew. His main duty is 
operation of the drilling and hoisting equipment, but he is also responsible for the 
downhole condition of the well, operation of downhole tools, and pipe measurements. * 
DRILL STHNG FLOAT - A check valve, run as an integral part of the pipe string, that 
allows fluid to be circulated down the drill string, but will prevent backflow. 
DRILLING SPOOL - A connection component with both ends either flanged. or hubbed. 
It must have an internal diameter at least equal to the bore of the blowout preventer and 
can have smaller side outlets for connecting auxilhry lines. 
EMERGENCY BACKUP SYSTEM - An accessory to the accumulator unit which provides 
an independent source of energy to operate the preventers. 
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FILL-UP LINE - A line, usually connected into the bell nipple above the blowout 
preventers, that allows the addition of mud to the hole while pulling out of the hole, in 
order to compensate for the displacement of the drill string. 
FLOORMAN - A drilling crew member whose work station is on the demck floor. On 
rotary drilling rigs, there are at least two and usually three or more floormen on each 
crew. Also called rotary helper and roughneck. 
FLOW LINE - A line connecting the well bore to the hole fluid storage or processing 
area. 
GATE VALIE - A valve utilizing a sliding gate to open or dose the flow passage. May 
or may not be full opening. 
HOLE FLUID MONITORING EOUIPMENT - BOPE accessories which indicate or record 
information concerning the hole fluid system, such as volume of fluid used, presence or 
absence of fluid, and changes in the volume or physical characteristics of the fluid. 
INSIDE BLOWOUT PREENTER - See Internal Preventer. . .  
INTERNAL PREWhTER - A device, which acts as a check valve, that can be installed 
in the drill string. It  allows fluid to be circulated down the drill string but prevents back 
flow. 
KELLY - The heavy steel member, four- or six-sided, suspended from the swivel through 
the rotary table and connected to the topmost joint of drill pipe to turn the drill stem as 
the rotary table turns. It has a bored passageway that permits fluid to be circulated into 
the drill stem and up the annulus, or vice versa. 
KELLY COCK LOWER - A full opening valve installed immediately below the kelly, 
with outside diameter equal to the tool joint OD. Can be closed to remove the kelly 
under pressure, and can be stxipped into the hole for snubbing operations. 
KELLY COCK, UPPER - A valve immediately above the kelly that can be shut to confine 
pressures inside the drill string. 
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KICK - The intrusion of formation liquids or gas that results in an increase in pit volume. 
Without corrective measures, this can result in a blowout. 
KILL LINE - A high pressure line between the pumps and some point below a blowout 
preventer that allows fluids to be pumped into the well or annulus when the preventer is 
closed. 
LOG - A systematic recording of data, as from the driller's log, mud log, electrical well 
log, or radioactivity log. Many different logs are run in wells being produced or drilled to 
obtain various characteristics of downhole formations. 
LOST CIRCULATION - The loss of quantities of whole mud to a formation, usually in 
cavernous, fissured, or coarsely permeable beds, evidenced by the complete or partial 
failure of the mud to return to the surface as it is being circulated in the hole. 
LOST RETURNS - Loss of drilling fluids into the formation, resulting in a decrease in pit 
volume. 
MOTORMAN - The crew member on a rotary drilling rig responsible for the care and 
operation of drilling engines. 
MUD LOGGING - The recording of information derived from examination and analysis 
of formation cuttings made by the bit and mud circulated out of the hole. A portion of 
the mud is diverted through a gas-detecting device. Mud logging is ofien carried out in a 
portable laboratory set up at,the well to examine cuttings brought u p  by the mud. 
MUD-RETURN LINE - A trough or pipe placed between the surface connections at the 
wellbore and the shale shaker, through which drilling mud flows upon its r e m  to the + 
surface from the hole. 
MUD WIGHTRECORDER - A graphical display of the input from the instrument in 
the mud system which continuously measures mud density. 
PACKOFF or STRIPPER - A device with an elastomer packing element that depends on 
pressure below the packing to effect a tight seal in the annulus. Used primarily to run or 
pull pipe under low or moderate pressures. Cannot be depended upon under high- 
differential pressures. 
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PIPE RAMS - Rams with faces contoured to seal around pipe to close the annular space. 
Unless special rams accommodating various pipe sizes are used, separate rams are 
necessary for each pipe size in use. See Ram-me Preventer. 
PIT L E E L  INDICATOR - A device installed in the mud tank to register the fluid level 
in the tank. 
RAM-TYPE PREENTER - A device that seals the open space in the well bore by forcing 
two horizontal sliding gates (rams) agahst one another. See Blind Rams or Pipe Rams. 
RIA - The demck or mast, drawworks, and attendant surface equipment of a drilling unit. 
ROTATING HEAD - A rotating, pressure-sealing device used when drilling with air, gas, 
foam, or any other drilling fluid with hydrostatic pressure less than the formation pressure. 
SEmING CASING - To run and cement casing at a certah depth in the wellbore. 
Sometimes, the term "set pipe" is used when referring to setting casing. 
SHALE SHAKER - A series of trays with sieves that vibrate to remove cuttings from the 
circulating fluid in rotaq drilling operations. The size of the openings in the sieve is 
carefully selected to match the size of the solids in the drilling fluid and the anticipated 
size of cuttings. Also called a shaker. 
SLAB GATE VALW - A mechanical, positive-sealing device that is used as a master 
valve on geothermal well heads. 
STANDPIPE - A vertical pipe rising along the side of the derxick or mast, which joins the 
discharge line leading from the mud pump to the rotary hose and through which mud is 
pumped going into the hole. 
SWABBING - The lowering of the hydrostatic pressure in the hole resulting from the 
upward movement of pipe and/or tools. 
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DRILLING HISTORY B E W E N  MAY 1. 1991 AND JUNE 6, 1991 
Moved in and rigged up Parker Drilling Company rig #231. 
Rigged up for 3 hours, drilled rat hole for 8-1/2 hours with Eastman mud 
motor. Picked up 26-inch bit with mud motor, drilled from 35' to 77'. 
Laid down 26-inch bit, picked up 42-inch hole opener. 
Waited for 7 hours, from 12 midnight to 7:OO am because of noise 
complaints. Opened 26-inch hole to 42". 
Continued opening hole from 26" to 42" to the depth of 77 ' . Laid down 
drilling tools (bottom hole assembly). Picked up 30-inch conductor pipe, 
landed on bottom, cemented conductor with 150 sacks of Hawaii cement. 
Welded on rotating head to 30-inch conductor. 
Continued installing rotating head and flow line. Picked up 26-inch drill bit, 
drilled from 74' to 161 '. 
Continued drilling 26-hch hole, from 161 ' to 253'. (Drilling with air.) 
Drilled from 253 ' to 297', ran directional survey, drilled from 297' to 
390', pulled out of hole, installed drilling jars, ran back to bottom of hole, 
drilled from 390 ' to 422 ' . (Drilling with air and foam.) 
Drilled from 422 ' to 573 ' . (Drilling with air and' foam.) 
Drilled from 573 ' to 630'. (Drilling with air and foam.) Pulled out of 
hole, and rigged up bailer on swab line and bailed water for 6 hours (44 
samples or runs). Representative water sample taken for State authorities. 
Ran in hole with new bit #2. Worked through tight spot in hole at 544 ' . 
Washed and reamed from 605' to 630', 25' of cuttings (or fill). Drilled 
from 630' to 734 ' . (Drilling with air and foam.) 
Drilled from 734' to 933'. (Drilling with air and foam.) 
Drilled 26-inch hole from 933' to 1039'. Tripped out of hole, picked up 
reamer, ran in hole to 169', washing and reaming hole to 347'. Shut 
down operation at 10:30 pm until 12 midnight because of noise complaint. 
From 12 midnight to 6:OO am (6 hours), waited because of noise, ran in 
hole, continued reaming from 347' to 867' (reaming with air and foam). 
Reamed from 867' to 1039', drilled new hole from 1039' to 1049', 
circulated hole with air and foam, pulled drill bit out of hole, rigged up to 
run 20-inch diameter casing and weld on shoe. 
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05-15-91: Ran 26 joints of 20-inch casing and cemented same, 20-inch casing set at 
depth of 1032'. Waited on cement to set up. 
05-16-91: Ran 1-inch pipe on back side to the depth of 767', cemented with 170 
sacks Hawaii cement. Pulled 1-inch pipe out, waited on cement, ran 1-inch 
pipe back to 767', pumped 159 sacks of Hawaii cement, waited on cement. 
05-17-91: Waited on cement, ran in hole with 1-inch pipe to 767' pumped in 308 
sacks Hawaii cement. Waited on cement, ran in with 1-inch pipe to top of 
cement at 780'. Cemented through 1-inch pipe with 500 sacks of Hawaii 
cement, pulled out of hole, waited on cement, ran in hole with 1-inch pipe 
to top of cement at 300'. Cemented through 1-inch pipe with 500 sacks of 
Hawaii cement. Pulled out of hole, waited on cement, ran in hole to top of 
cement at 270', cemented through 1-inch pipe with 500 sacks of Hawaii 
cement, waited on cement. Cement at surface. 
05-18-91: Cut off 20-inch casing, installed blow out prevention equipment which 
consisted of 1 Hydril and 1 rotating head. Laid down 26-inch drilling 
assembly, picked up 17-1/2-inch drilling assembly. 
05-19-91: Cleaned cement out of Hydril, ran in hole. Tested casing, pumped away at 
400 psi into formation, no test results. Cut and slipped drilling line and 
pulled out of hole, ran back in hole to top of cement at 996'. Rigged up 
Halliiburton, cemented inside of 20-inch casing with 120 sacks cement. 
Closed Hydril, squeezing cement into formation, pulled out of hole, picked 
up a Bottom'Hole Assembly, ran in hole and tagged top of cement at 927'. 
Drilled out cement from 927' to 1039'. Cleaned out to 1049'. Pulled out 
of hole, set back drilling assembly, ran back in hole open-ended to the depth 
of 1049 ' . 
05-20-91: Rigged up Hailiiurton, pumped in 380 sacks of cement, pulled 3 stands of 
drill pipe, pumped 45 bbls of mud, could not fill the hole, tripped out, * 
waited on cement. Tripped in, tagged cement at 844', drilled out cement 
from 844' to 1028', closed Hydril, tested casing to 600 psi, held for 30 
minutes. 
05-21-91: Drilled cement from 1028' to 1035', tested formation by performing leak 
off test. Pumped into formation at 400 psi while pumping with rig pump. 
hstalled rotating head. Drilled cement from 1035' to 1049 ', drilled from 
1049' to 1100' into formation. Circulated, surveyed at lobo', 2-1/4 
degree, pulled out of hole, ran in hole open-ended. Rigged up Halliiburton, 
pumped 129 sacks of Hawaii cement, pulled out of hole, ran in hole with 
drilling assembly to top of cement at 1008'. Drilled cement from 1008' to 
1055', pulled out of hole with drilling assembly, ran back in hole 
open-ended. Rigged up Halliburton, pumped 105 sacks Hawaii cement. 
Closed Hydril, pumped 36 bbls of water at 500 psi and pulled out of hole. 
B-2 
05-22-91 : 
05-23-91 : 
05-24-91 : 
05-25-91: 
05-26-91: 
05-27-91 : 
05-28-91 : 
Tripped in hole to 828', waited on cement for 5-1/2 hours. Ran in hole, 
tagged cement at 1031', drilled cement from 1031' to 1057'. Pressure 
tested formations. Cleaned mud pits, pulled out of hole, ran in hole 
open-ended, dropped stand of drill pipe in hole, picked up fishing tools, 
went in hole, retrieved stand of drill pipe. Ran back in hole to 1023', 
rigged up Halliiurton cemented with 211 sacks of Hawaii cement. Pulled 3 
stands, closed Hydrill, pumped in 35 bbls of water. Shut in for 30 minutes 
at 800 psi. Pulled out of hole and waited on cement. 
Waited on cement, tripped in hole with drilling assembly, tagged top of 
cement at 812', drilled out cement to 1050', pressure tested formation to 
100 psi, pressure fell to zero, did not hold. Drilled cement from 1050' to 
1100 &. Drilled formation from 1100' to 1150 ' . Pulled out of hole, tripped 
in hole open-ended to 1150 ' . 
Rigged up Hallburton, and pumped 200 sacks of Hawaii cement, tripped 
out of hole, waited on cement for 5-1/2 hours, tripped in with drilling 
assembly to top of cement at 940 ' . Drilled cement from 940 ' to 1150 ' , 
drilled formation from 1150' to 1165'. Pulled bit up into casing and 
cleaned mud pits. Ran in hole, tagged fill at 1121 ', cleaned out from 
1121' to 1165', drilled new formation from 1165' to 1287'. 
Drilled from 1287' to 1366', surveyed, 1/2 degree, continued drilling from 
1366 ' to 1386', tripped out with drilling assembly, ran in hole open-ended, 
rigged up H&%urton, pumped 205 sacks of Hawaii cement. Pulled out of 
hole, waited on cement for 8-1/4 hours. Ran in hole with drilling assembly 
to top of cement at 1198', drilled cement from 1198' to 1334'. 
Continued driljing cement from 1334' to 1386'. Pulled out of hole with 
plugged bit, ran in hole with drilling assembly to 1289', washed and 
reamed from 1289' to 1386', drilled new formation from 1386' to 1549'. 
Pulled out of hole. Installed rotating head. Ran in hole open-ended, tagged 
fill at 1460', washed out fill from 1460' to 1549'. Rigged up Halliiburton, 
pumped 220 sacks of Hawaii cement. Ran drilling assembly to 950', 
installed rotating head, waited on cement 3-1/2 hours. 
Ran in hole, tagged cement at 1367', drilled cement from 1367' to 1539', 
no cement from 1539' to 1549'. Pulled out of hole with plugged bit, 
unplugged bit, ran in hole with drilling assembly, tagged fill at 1412', 
washed and reamed from 1412' to 1549', drilled new formation from 
1549' to 1612', surveyed at 1550', 1-1/4 degrees S-85"-W, continued 
drilling from 1612' to 1683'. 
Drilled from 1683' to 1859', surveyed at 1820', 1-3/4 degrees, S-80"-W, 
continued drilling to 2020', tripped out of hole, ran in hole open-ended to 
2020', rigged up Halli%urton, pumped 290 sacks of Hawaii cement, pulled 
out of hole, ran in hole with drilling assembly to 1000'. 
B-3 
05-29-91 : 
05-30-91 : 
05-31-91: 
06-01-91: 
06-02-91: 
06-03-91 : 
06-04-91 : 
06-05-91: 
06-06-91 : 
Waited on cement, ran in hole, tagged cement at 1848', drilled cement 
from 1848' to 2020', drilled new formation from 2020' to 2134', tripped 
out of hole, rigged up to run 13-3/8-inch casing. Ran 13-3/8-inch casing. 
.Continued running 13-3/8-hch casing to the depth of 2128'. Rigged down 
casing crew, ran in hole with 5-inch drill pipe screwed into shoe. Rigged up 
Halliiurton, cemented with 705 sacks of Hawaii cement. Pulled out of hole, 
waited on cement. 
Continued waiting on cement. Cement fell 174' in casing annulus, ran 1- 
inch pipe, pumped 100 sacks of Hawaii cement. Waited on cement. Cut off 
13-3/8-inch casing, welded on 13-3/8-inch well head (3000#), preheated 
with HOT-head. 
Continued welding on well head, installed 13-5/8-inch Blow Out Prevention 
Equipment. Tested Blow Out Prevention Equipment at 600 psi for 30 
minutes. Ran in hole with drilling assembly to top of cement at 2073 *, 
pressure tested pipe rams, choke manifold, Hydril to 600 psi for 30 minutes. 
Drilled cement from 2073' to 2134', drilled new formation from 2134' to 
2276', surveyed at 2225*, 3-1/4 degrees, S-89"-W. Pulled out of hole. 
Ran in hole with mud motor, attempted to orient mud motor, pulled out of 
hole, worked on mule shoe and bent sub. 
Ran in hole, oriented mud motor, drilled 12-1/4-inch hole from 2276' to 
2347'. Blew 'out kelly hose, pulled 4 stands of drill pipe, installed new kelly 
hose, ran back in hole. Drilled and surveyed from 2347' to 2598'. 
Drilled and surveyed from 2598' to 2627', tripped out of hole, laid down 
mud motor, picked up drilling assembly, ran in hole to 2270*, washed and 
reamed from %270 * to 2627'. Drilled from 2627 * to 2641 * , surveyed, 
pulled out of hole, picked up mud motor, ran in hole, oriented mud motor, 
drilled from 2641 to 2689 *. 
Drilled and surveyed from 2689' to 2934', pulled out of hole, laid down 
mud motor, picked up driUing assembly, ran in hole, reamed from 2627' to 
2898 * . 
Reamed from 2898 * to 2934 *, drilled and surveyed from 2934 to 3177'. 
B-4 
